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I Comments I
Native American Oral Traditional Evidence




American history is rife with conflict between Native American
cultures and the Anglo-American legal system. When Native American
groups bring claims in federal court, they face a host of biases that fail to
consider their distinctive cultural background. One such bias concerns
the use of oral traditional evidence as testimony at trial. Because Native
American groups were largely non-literate prior to European contact,
Native Americans often use oral traditional evidence as testimony if the
matter requires evidence extending centuries into the past.
Unfortunately, the law regarding Native Americans' use of oral
traditional evidence as testimony has been particularly problematic
because the existing jurisprudence has created uncertainty and
inconsistency. This generates negative consequences because without
the use of oral traditional evidence, Native American groups may lack
the means to contend with opposing parties.
* Rachel Awan is a 2014 Juris Doctor Candidate of The Dickinson School of Law
of the Pennsylvania State University. She received her Bachelor of Arts in
Anthropology, summa cum laude, from the Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania in
2011.
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American courts have attempted to handle this genre of evidence for
almost a century. Their efforts, however, have resulted in an array of
cases that are nearly impossible for future claimants and litigants to
follow. Specifically, cases from both the U.S. claims court and circuit
courts do not detail the methods used in rejecting or admitting the oral
traditional evidence. This creates harmful uncertainty for potential
claimants who wish to use oral traditional evidence.
This Comment discusses American and Canadian jurisprudence, as
the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly created an evidentiary
exception to accommodate aboriginal oral traditional evidence. This
Comment then proposes a rule of evidence to guide American courts in
making informed decisions regarding Native American oral traditional
evidence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While American courts have handled disputes regarding the clash
between European and Native American cultures since the earliest years
of this nation,' legal areas concerning these conflicts still exist today, and
are uncertain and difficult to reconcile. One example of an area with
such uncertainty is the use of Native American oral tradition as evidence.
Native American groups often lack documentary information about
their extensive pasts, as many of these societies were non-literate prior to
the arrival of Europeans.2 Consequently, when Native American groups
bring claims into federal court-such as land claims,3 tribal status
claims,4 or cultural artifacts claims brought under the Native American
1. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 14 (1831) (stating that the
Native Americans' "relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his
guardian"); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823) (holding that
"discovery [of the United States] gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest."). See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (stating that the Cherokee Nation has laws which the United
States cannot hinder), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
2. See generally Glen Stohr, Comment, The Repercussions of Orality in Federal
Indian Law, 31 AiZ. ST. L.J. 679 (1999) (detailing the numerous issues stemming from
the non-literacy of most Native American societies, primarily the difficulties Native
Americans have under the Free Exercise Clause).
3. See generally Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 2 F.3d 219 (7th Cir.
1993) (discussing oral evidence concerning a treaty and the Sokaogon's claim to the land
covered by the treaty); Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987)
(discussing the Zuni's title to land in a land damages case); Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184 (1966) (discussing
whether the oral traditional evidence presented sufficiently proved that the tribal
claimants had occupied the land for a long time); Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct.
Cl. 501 (1964) (holding that the tribal claimants established title to land when their oral
traditional evidence was the only evidence presented in the case); Coos Bay Indian Tribe
v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143 (1938) (asserting that the oral traditional evidence
presented was not sufficient to afford the tribal claimants title in the land in question);
Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 347 (1933) (asserting that the oral
traditional testimony was not reliable enough to afford the tribal claimants damages for
the land they had lost).
4. See generally Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass.
1977) (discussing whether the Mashpee people were a "tribe" under the Indian
Nonintercourse Act).
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Graves Protection and Repatriation Act5 (NAGPRA)-Native American
groups may wish to support their cases with oral traditional evidence.6
To ease discussion when describing various types of oral traditional
evidence, this Comment will adopt the definitions, with some
modifications, that Jan Vansina created in his seminal work, Oral
Tradition as History.7 Vansina differentiates between two kinds of oral
evidence: oral histories, "which occur[] during the lifetime of
informants[,],, 8 and oral tradition, "which [include] reported statements
from the past beyond the present generation." 9 Both oral histories and
oral tradition are "oral statements spoken, sung, or called out on musical
instruments only."' 10 While this Comment will use Vansina's definitions,
it will also use the phrase "oral traditional evidence" as an umbrella term
to refer to all oral sources unique to non-literate societies.
Part II of this Comment will begin with an overview of oral
traditional evidence and its potential use as a source of truth. Part II will
then describe the American and Canadian jurisprudence that discusses
oral traditional evidence. The United States has two branches of caselaw
dealing with oral traditional evidence: those cases decided in the claims
court" and those decided in the circuit courts. Part II will first detail two
U.S. Court of Claims cases from the 1930s along with two more recent
U.S. Court of Appeals cases, all of which treat oral traditional evidence
in a negative manner,' a followed by a discussion of three U.S. claims
5. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-
3005 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discussing whether 9,000 year old oral traditional evidence was reliable enough to prove
tribal affiliation or ancestry with ancient human remains).
7. JAN VANSNA, ORAL TRADITION AS HISTORY (1985). Vansina is a well-known
anthropologist and historian who specializes in the study of Central Africa. He is a
professor emeritus at University of Wisconsin-Madison. See Living with Africa, U. WIS.
PRESS, http://bit.ly/ljRrAva (last updated Aug. 11, 2010) (referring to Vansina's
autobiography, Living With Africa).
8. VANSINA, supra note 7, at 12.
9. Id. at 27.
10. Id.at27-28.
11. This court was called the U.S. Court of Claims from 1855 until 1982, when it
was abolished and replaced by the U.S. Claims Court, which retained jurisdiction over all
the U.S. Court of Claims' cases. US. Court of Federal Claims, 1982-Present, FED. JUD.
CENTER, http://1.usa.gov/ljdAa4F (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). In 1992, the court was
renamed U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Id. This Comment will use each court title as it
applies to the case being discussed, and will use "claims court" to refer to this court
generally. "The Court of Federal Claims is authorized to hear primarily money claims
founded upon the Constitution, federal statutes, executive regulations, or contracts,
express or implied-in-fact, with the United States." About the Court, U.S. CT. FED.
CLAIMs, http://l.usa.gov/lnOMSXy (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
12. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2004);
Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 2 F.3d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1993); Coos Bay
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court cases that took a more positive stance in admitting the evidence.
3
Finally, Part II will discuss three Canadian cases that together created an
evidentiary exception for oral traditional evidence.
14
Part III of this Comment will compare and analyze the American
and Canadian jurisprudence in order to demonstrate the need to adopt a
Federal Rule of Evidence that will accommodate the use of oral
traditional evidence in U.S. courts. The Part will also discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of an anthropologist's unique methods in
presenting oral traditional evidence to the Claims Court 5 in Zuni Tribe of
New Mexico v. United States,'6 as well as the hearsay exception in the
line of Canadian cases. Part III will culminate with a proposed rule of
evidence that explicitly allows for the use of oral traditional evidence and
requires courts to balance several factors when determining whether to
admit or reject the evidence at hand.
II. BACKGROUND AND CASES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA
A. Oral Traditional Evidence in Anglo-American Courts and Its
Disputed Reliability
While the terms "oral tradition" and "oral history" differentiate the
ages of oral traditional evidence, the manner in which oral information is
passed from generation to generation also varies widely between
cultures. For example, the formalistic oral tradition told by the Gitksan
and the Wet'suwet'en Nation in the Canadian case Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia17 were "'repeated, performed and authenticated at
important feasts."",18 On the other hand, the oral histories presented in
Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143, 152-53 (1938); Assiniboine Indian Tribe v.
United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 347, 368 (1933).
13. See Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United
States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 204 (1966); Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 505
(1964). See generally Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987).
14. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 87 (Can.); R.
v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 68 (Can.); Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British
Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, para. 152 (Can.).
15. See generally Andrew Wiget, Recovering the Remembered Past: Folklore and
Oral History in the Zuni Trust Lands Damages Case, in ZUNI AND THE COURTS: A
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGN LAND RIGHTS 173 (E. Richard Hart ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Folklore and Oral History] (detailing Wiget's methods while working with the Zuni; he
had over 1,000 pages of depositions, worked with numerous informants, and did not have
access to outside evidence while he was with the Zuni).
16. Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987).
17. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 87 (Can.).
18. Id. at para. 93 (quoting Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97,
164 (Can. B.C. S.C.)).
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Zuni Tribe of New Mexico v. United States1 9 consisted of little more than
individuals' accounts of information relayed to them by their parents and
grandparents. 20  The Zuni Tribe oral histories were not ritualistic; an
anthropologist presented the evidence to the court in the form of
numerous depositions-an uncommon method-rather than having the
native group perform the oral traditional evidence.2' Whether the
evidence is ritualistic oral tradition or informal anecdotal evidence, oral
traditional evidence can cause problems in Anglo-American courts,
which have long been dependent on textual evidence.
While the rift between oral and textual documentation is one
difference between aboriginal and European cultures, concepts of history
differ as well.22 For example, in many Native cultures, the concept of
time is cyclical, while in Judeo-Christian culture, time is linear.23
Moreover, oral traditional evidence cannot be viewed in a vacuum; these
traditions and histories are closely tied to culture and must be viewed in
that context, thus providing "strong continuity with a past group. 2 4
Understanding the culture of a speaker is relevant, as the sources are
often "repositories of fact, observation, and history intertwined with
personal belief and analogy," rather than clear fact.25 These differences
between oral traditional evidence and the culture in Anglo-American
legal systems often cause confusion, and scholars have discussed at
length whether courts ought to admit this genre of evidence.
B. The Disputed Reliability of Oral Traditional Evidence as a Source
of Truth
While courts often hesitate to admit oral traditional evidence,
scholars have explored both the legal and historical uses of this genre of
evidence in courts and histories. The hallmark of oral traditional
19. Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987).
20. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 175-76 (exhibiting brief
excerpts of the depositions).
21. See id at 173-74; Stohr, supra note 2, at 693-94 (explaining how performance
of formal, ritualized oral tradition in court can place claimants at a disadvantage); see
also infra note 135 and accompanying text.
22. See Stohr, supra note 2, at 684-85.
23. See id.
24. John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the
Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part One), 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y J. 349, 395 (2004).
25. John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal Implications of
American Archaeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REv. 1, 45-46
(2007).
26. See Cohan, supra note 24, at 396 (detailing why oral traditional evidence should
not be construed as historical fact); Ragsdale, supra note 25, at 45-46 (arguing that oral
traditional evidence has its roots in truth). See generally Gordon M. Day, Oral Tradition
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evidence is its relative fluidity: edition and translation occur during
interpretation rather than after, as with textual documents.27 When the
oral tradition or history is interpreted, reinterpretation occurs multiple
times in a chain. This differs greatly from textual evidence, as readers
are isolated in their reinterpretations of written works.28 A reader of a
written work is not forced to depend on the interpretation of a previous
reader.29 This defining aspect of oral traditional evidence has resulted in
varying views among scholars concerning whether oral traditional
evidence can ever be a source of "truth" in either legal or historical
settings.
One view scholars advocate is that courts should admit and
recognize Native American oral traditional evidence for its potential as a
source of truth. 30  Despite its shortcomings, some tribalists and non-
Native American scientists "recognize that the oral tradition is premised
on fact rather than imagination, and that both the nature and ,necessity of
accurate recounting within oral societies make these histories valuable
indicators of the past., 31 If courts treat oral traditional evidence with the
suspicion ordinarily given to hearsay evidence,32 one may counter with
the well-known axiom, "'[w]here there is smoke, there must be fire[.]'
33
While hearsay rumors can be, and often are, false, these "rumors tend to
die out as the expected consequences of the rumors do not occur. 34
When groups have reason to be believe the rumors are true, the rumors
as Complement, 19 ETHNOHISTORY 99 (1972) (arguing that, in the context of the Abenaki
people, oral tradition can complement history); David M. Pendergast & Clement W.
Meighan, Folk Traditions as Historical Fact: A Paiute Example, 72 J. Am. FOLKLORE
128 (1959) (analyzing Paiute informants' statements and their consistency with
archaeological data); Andrew 0. Wiget, Truth and the Hopi: An Historiographic Study of
Documented Oral Tradition Concerning the Coming of the Spanish, 29 ETHNOHISTORY
181 (1982) [hereinafter Truth and the Hopi] (arguing that the cultural significance of the
oral traditional evidence, rather than its form, indicates its reliability).
27. John Miles Foley, Foreword to NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL TRADITIONS:
COLLABORATION & INTERPRETATION vii, vii (Larry Evers & Barre Toelken eds., 2001).
28. See VANSINA, supra note 7, at 29.
29. See id.
30. See Ragsdale, supra note 25, at 45-46.
31. Id.
32. While courts are often suspicious of oral traditional evidence, they do not cite the
rule against hearsay as precluding the testimony. See, e.g., Coos Bay Indian Tribe v.
United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143, 152 (1938) ("If this testimony is to prevail in every way
over documentary and historical evidence it is sufficient to observe that it does prove by
hearsay that plaintiffs did occupy the lands claimed from time immemorial." (emphasis
added)). The rule itself may indicate a broader cultural bias against "hearsay," or oral
evidence, whether or not it actually falls under the rule; however, this topic is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
33. VANSINA, supra note 7, at 6.
34. Id.
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may become part of an oral tradition.35 Additionally, in some Native
American traditions, "an aged person carefully and deliberately train[ed]
young children until some of them knew the old stories verbatim, as an
American child... might know The Night Before Christmas.36 Thus,
oral traditional evidence may not necessarily bear the risk of error at each
generational transmission.37 Finally, advocates of using oral traditional
evidence as a source of truth note that collective knowledge can be of
vital importance; individuals may not have particularly deep knowledge
about their group's past, but taken together, these individuals may be
able to piece together a comprehensive history.
38
Conversely, many scholars oppose the use of oral traditional
sources for historical and legal evidence. 39 From this perspective, the
way oral traditional evidence passes through generations is similar to
how messages are passed in the childhood game of telephone. During
such games, a message changes from person to person so as to be
entirely different by the end of the game. One scholar has identified
numerous pitfalls that occur when using oral traditional evidence to
support factual determinations of past occurrences, and has noted:
We have no way of knowing whether a narrative has been
altered .... The opportunity for error increases when information is
relayed through multiple persons over time. Intervening changes in
language may also alter the meaning of certain words or of the oral
tradition itself. Narratives can also be influenced by... biases and
are often intertwined with spiritual beliefs. It is not always clear
whether myths are being blurred with or even superseding historical
facts. Narratives are thus of limited reliability in attempting to
determine truly ancient events or linkages between present groups
and the past.4°
Jan Vansina, an advocate for the use of oral tradition and histories
in the study of history, similarly doubts how well such evidence can
provide truth about actual facts or events; rather, oral traditional evidence
may best be used to determine "events generalized ' or group opinions
and trends.42 Vansina goes so far as to say "[i]t is... important to
scrutinize traditions for signs that they are in fact expressions of
35. See id.
36. Day, supra note 26, at 103.
37. See id.
38. See Pendergast & Meighan, supra note 26, at 131. See generally Folklore and
Oral History, supra note 15.
39. See VANSINA, supra note 7, at 31-32, 193; Cohan, supra note 24, at 396.
40. Cohan, supra note 24, at 396.
41. VANSINA, supra note 7, at 31.
42. See id.
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generalizations or norms rather than statements of observations of events
or situations. ' ' 3
Oral traditions that are particularly ancient come with their own
challenges. As tradition grows older, the risks become magnified and
"peak when one deals with traditions of origin."44 Vansina, however,
states that recent oral traditional evidence that extends only "one or two
generations beyond the eldest living members in a community. . . suffers
only small damage. 45
The rule against hearsay, 46 one of the hallmarks of Anglo-American
legal systems, can influence courts' decisions regarding the reliability of
oral traditional evidence.47  Because oral traditional evidence, by
definition, is told from one person to another, courts could consider it
hearsay. Thus, if the evidence spans numerous generations, it will
contain several layers of hearsay.48 Although relevant, American courts
have rarely cited the rule against hearsay when confronted with oral
traditional evidence.49 Canadian courts, however, have acknowledged
that oral traditional evidence is hearsay and have created an evidentiary
exception.50
C. Use of Oral Traditional Evidence in Court
Native Americans in the United States and aboriginal groups in
Canada use oral traditional evidence for cases in which they must prove
activity extending before the arrival of Europeans.5 1 In the United States
and, until recently, Canada, the written word has triumphed in courts,
with oral traditional evidence looked upon as inferior or in need of
43. Id. at 31-32.
44. Id. at 193.
45. Id. at 192-93.
46. "'Hearsay' means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement." FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
47. See, e.g., Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. CI. 143, 152 (1938);
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 86 (Can.).
48. See Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 86.
49. In fact, only one American court acknowledged that such evidence was hearsay,
but that court rejected the evidence on other grounds. See Coos Bay Indian Tribe, 87 Ct.
Cl. at 152 (rejecting tribal claimant's evidence because the witnesses were too self-
interested).
50. See Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 87.
51. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2004); Pueblo
de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 504 (1964); Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 64-
65. See generally Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass.
1977) (discussing whether the Mashpee people were a "tribe" under the Indian
Nonintercourse Act).
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corroboration by other evidence. 2 In many situations, Native American
and Canadian aboriginal groups do not have documentary evidence of
high quality from the requisite time periods. 53 Instead, these groups can
attest only to the information their ancestors have passed down orally.
5 4
Oral traditional evidence is typically utilized in four different types
of claims. First, the use of oral traditional evidence is often discussed in
land claims.55 To establish a valid land claim, tribal claimants usually
must show that they have occupied the land for a significant period of
time, sometimes referred to as "time immemorial," which typically
extends to a time before European contact.5 6 Often the only evidence
claimants can produce is the oral traditional evidence of their tribe.57
Next, tribal claimants may use oral traditional evidence to repatriate
sacred or funerary objects or human remains through the NAGPRA5
52. See Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United States,
177 Ct. Cl. 184, 204 (1966) ("The importance of corroboration and cross-checking
cannot be undervalued since informants can mislead researchers by describing some
period (usually the reservation one) besides the aboriginal, pre-treaty period."); Pueblo de
Zia, 165 Ct. Cl. at 504 (referring to the lower court's decision: "Notwithstanding such
specific documentary corroborations and the general dovetailing, and hence corroboration
of historical and archaeological evidence and testimony which we are about to discuss,
the Commission saw fit to virtually ignore the Indians' testimony..."); see also Stohr,
supra note 2, at 680-81.
53. See Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, par. 152 (Can.)
(stating that, while corroboration through other evidence would be helpful, oral
traditional evidence should still be able to stand on its own without corroboration or if it
contradicts other evidence, implying that corroboration may be difficult); Truth and the
Hopi, supra note 26, at 183 (explaining that the seventeenth century documentary
evidence, with which the author was corroborating the Hopi oral tradition, was
unreliable, because much of it was from a Spanish Inquisition trial).
54. See Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 87; Tsilhqot'in, 2007 BCSC at para. 152.
55. See generally Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 2 F.3d 219 (7th Cir.
1993) (discussing oral evidence concerning a treaty and the Sokaogon's claim to the land
covered by the treaty); Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987)
(discussing the Zuni's title to land in a land damages case); Confederated Tribes, 177 Ct.
Cl. 184 (discussing whether the oral traditional evidence presented sufficiently proved
that the tribal claimants had occupied the land for a long time); Pueblo de Zia, 165 Ct. Cl.
501 (holding that the tribal claimants established title to land when their oral traditional
evidence was the only evidence presented in the case); Coos Bay Indian Tribe, 87 Ct. Cl.
143 (asserting that the oral traditional evidence presented was not sufficient to afford the
tribal claimants title in the land in question); Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States,
77 Ct. Cl. 347 (1933) (asserting that the oral traditional testimony was not reliable
enough to afford the tribal claimants damages for the land they had lost).
56. See Zuni Tribe, 12 Cl. Ct. at 607; Pueblo de Zia, 165 Ct. Cl. at 504; Assiniboine,
77 Ct. Cl. at 358.
57. See Zuni Tribe, 12 Cl. Ct. at 607; Pueblo de Zia, 165 Ct. Cl. at 504; Assiniboine,
77 Ct. Cl. at 358.
58. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3005 (2012).
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This statute includes oral tradition as acceptable evidence.5 9 Tribal
claimants also use this evidence to prove their status as an Indian tribe in
order to proceed with a substantive claim.60 Finally, oral tradition is used
to obtain or maintain aboriginal rights, such as hunting or fishing. 6'
While it is not difficult to conceive of claims in which Native American
or aboriginal Canadian groups may need to admit oral traditional
evidence, courts have often addressed the evidence in a negative manner,
especially in the early days of these claims' existence.
D. Rejection of Oral Traditional Evidence: Past and Present
Before the 1960s, and even in some recent circuit court cases, the
attitude toward oral traditional evidence in American courts was one of
dismissal.62  The following four court opinions address the use of oral
tradition in a limited and unhelpful manner, either by mentioning it in
dicta or giving the topic very little attention.63 The general trend of the
cases, however, illustrates that courts did not accept oral traditional
evidence as reliable. 64
1. U.S. Claims Court Cases
In Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States,65 a U.S. Court of
Claims case from 1933, the tribal claimants sought the right of
occupancy to two tracts of land, one of which fell under the Fort Laramie
Treaty of 1851 .66 The claimant Indian tribe was required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence 67 that it had occupied the land in question
59. Id. § 3005(a)(4). See generally Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th
Cir. 2004) (discussing whether the plaintiffs could establish either tribal affiliation or
ancestry with 9,000 year old human remains).
60. See generally Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass.
1977) (discussing whether the Mashpee people were a "tribe" under the Indian
Nonintercourse Act).
61. See generally R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.) (discussing whether
aboriginal fishing rights extended to commercial venues).
62. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881-82; Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon
Corp., 2 F.3d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1993); Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl.
143, 152-53 (1938); Assiniboine, 77 Ct. Cl. at 368.
63. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881-82; Sokaogon, 2 F.3d at 222; Coos Bay Indian
Tribe, 87 Ct. Cl. at 152-53; Assiniboine, 77 Ct. Cl. at 368.
64. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 881-82; Sokaogon, 2 F.3d at 222; Coos Bay Indian
Tribe, 87 Ct. Cl. at 152-53; Assiniboine, 77 Ct. Cl. at 368.
65. Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 347 (1933).
66. See id. at 362-63. The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 afforded protections and
land to "the Sioux or Dahcotahs, Cheyennes, Arrapahoes, Crows, Assiniboines, Gros-
Ventre Mandans, and Arrickaras." Treaty of Fort Laramie, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749.
67. See Assiniboine, 77 Ct. Cl. at 366. The second edition of Black's Law
Dictionary from 1910 defines "weight of evidence" or "preponderance of the evidence"
as "the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support
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by "immemorial possession., 68 While the court was not explicit in the
particulars of the evidence submitted by the Assiniboine, it did state that
the "[p]laintiff... introduced the greater number of witnesses giving oral
testimony[.],, 69 The court was hesitant to accept this evidence, stating
that "much of the evidence ... is from a source that lessens its
weight[,]" 70 emphasizing that the witnesses "were either ... children at
the time of the signing of the treaty or very old men at the time when
they gave their testimony, and on account of age having at best a very
incQmplete recollection of matters that occurred fifty years prior
thereto."'', The court concluded that "[t]he circumstances of the case
make this testimony so unsatisfactory as to be unworthy of any credit.,
72
Instead, the court accepted the testimony of government agents, asserting
that the agents were less biased and had lived with the Assiniboine for a
considerable period of time, thereby adding to their credibility. 73 The
agents alleged that the Assiniboine had migrated often during their
history and that they had never excluded other Native American tribes
from the land in question.74 Thus, the court found that the Assiniboine
did not occupy the land for the requisite period of time and denied their
71claim of occupancy.
In Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States,76 a case from 1938, the
U.S. Court of Claims addressed the issue of oral traditional evidence
more clearly than the Assiniboine court. The Coos Bay Indian Tribe,
along with several other smaller tribes, resided on a reservation over
which they did not have any treaty rights. 7 In 1855, the Superintendent
of Indian Affairs in Oregon, authorized by an act of Congress, negotiated
a treaty with these tribes for the possession of the tribes' land. 78 This
treaty was never ratified, and the plaintiffs sought to prove their
occupation of the land by submitting oral traditional evidence in support
of their position.79 Similar to the court in Assiniboine,8° the Coos Bay
one side of the issue rather than the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1224 (2d ed.
1910).
68. See Assiniboine, 77 Ct. C1. at 358.




73. See Assiniboine, 77 Ct. Cl. at 367.
74. Id. at 360.
75. Id. at 368.
76. Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143 (1938).
77. See id. at 148.
78. Id. at 150.
79. See id. at 152. The court did not specify the length of time required to prove
occupation. See id. at 153.
80. SeeAssiniboine, 77 Ct. Cl. 347.
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court did not describe the evidence in the opinion.81 Instead, the court
stated that "[i]f this testimony is to prevail in every way over
documentary and historical evidence it is sufficient to observe that it
does prove by hearsay that plaintiffs did occupy the lands claimed from
time immemorial[," perhaps indicating that the rule against hearsay does
not apply to oral traditional evidence as it does to most oral evidence.
82
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the oral testimony was insufficient
on its own to carry the tribal claimants' burden of proof.83 The court
emphasized that "at least seventeen of the twenty-one witnesses
produced ha[d] a direct interest in the outcome of the case"; thus, the
evidence could not overcome the written evidence presented by the
government.84 While these U.S. claims court cases illustrate the
prevailing ethnocentric attitudes from the 1930s, the following, more
recent U.S. circuit court cases have used reasoning remarkably similar to
that detailed above.
2. U.S. Court of Appeals Cases
Nearly 60 years after the two Court of Claims cases were decided,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided Sokaogon
Chippewa Community v. Exxon Corp.85  Although in a different
jurisdiction,86 the Sokaogon court reached a result similar to the
preceding cases.87 Here, the Sokaogon sought a declaration that the tribe
had the right to occupy a particular tract of land rich in mineral
deposits. 88 The issue before the court was whether the Sokaogon had
ceded their right after negotiating a treaty during the 1800S.89 The
Sokaogon primarily used oral traditional evidence detailing a promise of
a reservation.9" The court, skeptical of the evidence, stated that "there is
no documentation of this tradition, which is at best embroidered (too
many ransoms, shipwrecks, lost and stolen maps, and deathbed
revelations to be plausible) and at worst fictitious. ' 91 The court held that
the Sokaogon had failed to state a claim sufficient to bypass summary
81. See Coos Bay Indian Tribe, 87 Ct. CI. at 150-53.
82. Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 152-53.
84. Id. at 152.
85. Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 2 F.3d 219 (7th Cir. 1993).
86. The former cases were decided in the Court of Claims. Sokaogon and
Bonnichsen, discussed infra, were decided in federal circuit courts.
87. See Sokaogon, 2 F.3d at 222.
88. Id. at 220.
89. Id. at 221.
90. See id. at 222.
91. Id.
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judgment.92 The court explained that the oral traditional evidence was
not admissible because "no effort was made by the Sokaogon's counsel
to cast it into a form in which it would be admissible in a court of law."
93
The Sokaogon court used a rationale similar to that used in Assiniboine
and Coos Bay, even though the string of Court of Claims cases from the
1960s through the 1980s all but overruled that earlier rationale. 94 Most
recently, though, a case in the Ninth Circuit abided by reasoning similar
to that used by the Sokaogon court.95
Bonnichsen v. United States,96 a 2004 case from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, examined the use of oral traditional
evidence within the context of NAGPRA. 97  In Bonnichsen, human
remains approximately 9,000 years old were found in Washington
State.98 Due to the extreme age of the remains, archaeologists and other
scientists sought to study the body.99 Several local Native American
groups protested and wished to have the remains, known popularly as the
"Kennewick Man," repatriated under NAGPRA. °°
While NAGPRA allows courts to admit oral traditional evidence in
some quantity, 10 it remains unclear whether oral traditional or folkloric
evidence would be accepted on its own, without the corroboration of any
other type of evidence. 10 2 The Native American coalition in Bonnichsen
attempted to establish through published "folk narratives" and statements
from tribal members that either the Kennewick Man's remains had lineal,
Native American descendants, or they were affiliated with a modem
tribe. 10 3 The Native Americans failed to satisfy either of the above as the
92. Sokaogon, 2 F.3d at 224.
93. Id. at 224-25.
94. See Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 505 (1964) (declaring that
oral traditional evidence entitled to "some weight"). See generally Confederated Tribes
of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184 (1966)
(following Pueblo de Zia).
95. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2004).
96. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
97. See generally id.
98. See id. at 868.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 869-70.
101. Congress enacted NAGPRA to allow Native American tribes to retrieve sacred
and funerary items and human remains from the federal government where:
the requesting Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization can show cultural
affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence based upon geographical,
kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral
traditional, historical, or other relevant information or expert opinion.
25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (2012) (emphasis added).
102. See Elizabeth M. Koehler, Comment, Repatriation of Cultural Objects to
Indigenous Peoples: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Law, 41 INT'L LAW.
103, 116 (2007).
103. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 875, 881-82.
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remains were far older than any "presently existing" tribe. 1° 4 The court
was wary of the evidence and responded:
[B]ecause the value of such accounts is limited by concerns of
authenticity, reliability, and accuracy, and because the record as a
whole does not show where historical fact ends and mythic tale
begins, we do not think that the oral traditions ... were adequate to
show the required significant relationship of the Kennewick Man's
remains to the Tribal Claimants.... 8340 to 9200 years between the
life of Kennewick Man and the present is too long a time to bridge
merely with evidence of oral traditions.1
0 5
Again, this rationale shares similarities not only with the Sokaogon
court's reasoning, but also with that of the two Court of Claims cases
from the 1930s, Assiniboine and Coos Bay. Later claims court cases,
however, split from the 1930s cases, and tentatively admitted oral
traditional evidence.
E. Hesitant Acceptance of Oral Traditional Evidence
Beginning in the 1960s with Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 106 the
U.S. Court of Claims began accepting oral traditional evidence, at least
to an extent.
1. The 1960s U.S. Court of Claims Cases
The 1960s brought change regarding the acceptance of Native
American oral traditional evidence by the U.S. Court of Claims with two
cases: Pueblo de Zia'0 7 and Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation of Oregon v. United States.0 8 In each of these cases, the
Court of Claims explicitly recognized oral traditional evidence and
assigned it evidentiary weight.' 09
In Pueblo de Zia, the Native American claimants offered evidence
from various tribal council members.' 0 The testimony consisted of "oral
accounts handed down from father to son.. . from time immemorial.""
' n
The lower court did not give the claimants' oral tradition much weight,
104. See id. at 876-77.
105. Id. at 882 (footnote omitted).
106. Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501 (1964).
107. See generally id.
108. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United States,
177 Ct. CI. 184 (1966).
109. See id. at 204; Pueblo de Zia, 165 Ct. Cl. at 505.
110. Pueblo deZia, 165 Ct. Cl. at 504.
111. Id.
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and held that the claimants failed to uphold their burden.'1 12 Appellees'
brief further stated that the evidence was "literally worthless."' 13 The
Court of Claims, in contrast, emphasized that because the opposing party
did not proffer any evidence of its own, the court would give the oral
tradition "some weight."' 14 Even so, the court qualified the use of the
oral traditional evidence by stating that "corroboration of historical and
archaeological evidence and testimony" may be necessary. 115
In Confederated Tribes, the tribal claimants sought Indian title to
land by establishing "actual, exclusive and continuous use and
occupancy 'for a long time' prior to the loss of the land." ' 1 6 The court
followed the reasoning in Pueblo de Zia and heavily emphasized the
importance of cross-checking the evidence "since informants can mislead
researchers by describing some period ... besides the aboriginal, pre-
treaty period."'1 17  Thus, while these two cases established that tribal
claimants could indeed use oral traditional evidence in courts, the
requirement of corroboration by outside sources still severely limited its
use.118 The following case, Zuni Tribe of New Mexico v. United States,
goes further than the above cases, and allowed for the admission of a
large amount of oral traditional evidence, likely because of the expert
witness's innovative presentation."
19
2. Presentation of Oral Traditional Evidence: Zuni Tribe of New
Mexico v. United States
The Zuni Tribe case demonstrates that the manner in which oral
traditional evidence is presented to a court is important. Like the
previous cases, the U.S. Claims Court opinion in Zuni Tribe does not
reveal much detail about the claimants' oral traditional evidence.
120
Nevertheless, the Zuni Tribe case is important because of the way in
112. Id. at 503.
113. Id. at 505 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Appellee's Brief at 12).
114. Id.
115. Pueblo deZia, 165 Ct. Cl. at 504.
116. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United States,
177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194 (1966) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
118. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 173.
The problem of how to substantiate claims that depend on testimonies from oral
tradition is an especially serious one for traditional peoples for whom large
spans of their history and large areas of their domain lack written
documentation and whose conceptions of history do not always conform to
Western notions.
Id. (citing Fred Eggan, From History to Myth: A Hopi Example, in STuDiEs IN
SOUTHWESTERN ETHNOUNGUISTIcs 33 (Dell Hymes & William E. Bittle eds., 1967)).
119. See generally Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15.
120. See generally Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987).
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which the Zuni's expert witness utilized intensive methods to present the
evidence to the court.
12'
The availability of both the description of the evidence and the
expert's methods makes Zuni Tribe a particularly unusual case. The
claimants here sought compensation for the alleged taking of lands,
though the court opinion only discusses whether the Zuni had aboriginal
title to the land in question. 22 Again, the claimants had to prove "actual,
exclusive, and continuous use and occupancy for a long time (or from
time immemorial). 123 The claimants succeeded and prevailed. 24 Much
of the evidence offered consisted of oral histories, which the court
acknowledged:
Defendant conjectures, but offers no evidence to contradict or
impeach the Zuni recounting of their history. And, given the import
attached to the oral transmission of history and religious observation
by the Zuni, there is no reason to suspect gross or deliberate
distortion. Accordingly, the court is persuaded that, notwithstanding
some insufficiency, this recounted history is of evidentiary probity. 125
Despite this statement, the court did not describe the oral traditional
evidence, provide any binding authority for other courts to follow, or
explain why exactly the court was persuaded that the histories were "of
evidentiary probity."
1 26
Andrew Wiget, the anthropologist who worked with the Zuni during
this case, provided some insight through a detailed description of the
process he used to gather and organize the Zuni's oral histories. 27 Wiget
presented the oral histories to the court with 1,300 pages of
depositions. 28 This strategy likely had a greater impact than simply
allowing witnesses to give unstructured monologues on the stand
because Wiget presented the evidence in a format with which Anglo-
American courts are familiar. 1
29
121. See generally Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15 (detailing the efforts of
the anthropologist who worked with the Zuni to present their large amount of oral
traditional evidence to the court). This evidence was anecdotal, rather than formalized
oral tradition. See id. at 184. Although the court did not mention any details concerning
the evidence in the opinion, the tribal claimants prevailed. See generally Zuni Tribe, 12
Cl. Ct. 607.
122. Zuni Tribe, 12 Cl. Ct. at 608-09.
123. Id. at 607.
124. See id. at 609.
125. Id. at616n.12.
126. Id.
127. See generally Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15.
128. Id. at 173-74.
129. See Stohr, supra note 2, at 693-94. Stohr refers to an instance in a British
Columbia court in which the Haida Indians testified as to their own oral histories, dressed
in traditional, ceremonial garb. Id. at 693 (citing PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW
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Furthermore, Wiget created a method to demonstrate the
"integrity" of oral traditional evidence to courts. 130  He used three
criteria: validity, reliability, and consistency. 131 Validity depends on the
relationship between the oral tradition and other documents and
evidence;13 2 reliability depends on the ability of one individual to "'tell
the same story about the same events on different occasions[;]'" 33 and
consistency depends on "the degree to which the form or content of one
testimony conforms with other testimonies.
1 34
Wiget used depositions to acquire the oral histories. 135  He then
studied both the Zuni's repeated answers to his questions regarding land
conditions relevant to the claim and the answers that disagreed with the
majority of deponents. 136  He determined what most likely occurred
based on what the depositions alone provided. 137 Only after recording
the depositions did Wiget examine other evidence that supported the
conclusions he derived from his informants' statements. 138 In the end,
the oral histories supported and added detail to the available
archaeological evidence. 139  The court found Wiget's representation
credible, and the Zuni successfully established their "exclusive use and
occupancy" of the land in question.
140
F. Canadian Treatment of Oral Traditional Evidence
Unlike the United States, Canadian courts have explicitly addressed
the admissibility of oral traditional evidence and permitted its use, giving
179-208 (1990) (referring to Western Forest Products, Ltd. v. Richardson, an unreported
case)). The court was uncomfortable with the evidence and deemed it irrelevant, though
the Haida won their claim. Id. Stohr goes on to state:
When courts permit Indians to testify as to their own histories, the judges have
difficulty fitting such views of the world into the parameters of the legal
system. As such, they transform the court into a museum or ethnographic
interview. While this fits the model of 'collection' and appropriation by which
Indian speech is usually presented to non-Indians, it seriously undermines the
validity of such speech as courtroom testimony.
Id. at 694.
130. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 177.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 178 (quoting Alice Hoffman, Reliability and Validity in Oral History, in
ORAL HISTORY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 67, 70 (David K. Dunaway & Willa
K. Baum eds., 1984)).
134. Id. at 179.
135. Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 173-74.
136. See id. at 176-81.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 185.
139. See id.
140. Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607, 609 (1987).
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such evidence the same weight as written evidence in aboriginal title
cases. 141 The two Supreme Court of Canada cases that illustrate the
judicially created evidentiary exception for aboriginal oral traditional
evidence are R. v. Van der Peet142 and Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia.143  Because these cases, while revolutionary, have
promulgated a somewhat vague and unwieldy standard, this Comment
further discusses Tsilhqot'in v. British Columbia,'44 which provides
insight into how one lower court has interpreted and applied the
evidentiary standard.
R. v. Van der Peet addressed the issue of an aboriginal group's right
to commercially sell fish caught with a Native fishing license. 45  If
widespread fishing and trade were historically integral to the aboriginal
group in question, the group could continue selling the fish; thus, the
group sought to admit oral traditional evidence to support that fact.
146
The Court found that the evidence demonstrated that the commercial sale
of fish was not integral to the aboriginal group. 147 The Court addressed
the group's evidence, stating that "[t]he courts must not undervalue the
evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence
does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be
applied in, for example, a private law torts case.' 48  This statement
implied that an evidentiary exception was applicable to aboriginal
claims. The Supreme Court of Canada would readdress and clarify the
issue one year later.'
49
Delgamuukw expanded on the rationale set forth in Van der Peet,
revolutionizing aboriginal title claims in Canada. While the Supreme
Court of Canada did not reach a decision regarding the underlying land
dispute, 5° it did address the use of oral traditional evidence.' 5' The
Gitksan and the Wet'suwet'en Nations presented to the Court two highly
ritualized systems of oral tradition: the adaawk and the kungax.' 52 The
141. See e.g., Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 87
(Can.).
142. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.).
143. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
144. Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 (Can.).
145. Van der Peet, 2 S.C.R. at para. 2.
146. Id.
147. Id. at para. 91.
148. Id. at para. 68.
149. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 87 (Can.).
150. Id. atpara. 74.
151. Id. atpara. 87.
152. Id. at para. 93. The trial court described the adaawk and the kungax as "a sacred
'official' litany, or history, or recital of the most important laws, history, traditions and
traditional territory of a House." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97, 164 (Can. B.C. S.C.)). In
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Court noted that the oral tradition was "'repeated, performed and
authenticated at important feasts[,]'" which added to its reliability.
15 3
The court acknowledged that the use of oral traditional evidence in
Anglo-American courts creates certain difficulties 154 and that the
evidence at hand would ordinarily be considered hearsay. 1
55
Nevertheless, the court asserted that "the laws of evidence must be
adapted in order that this type of evidence can be accommodated and
placed on an equal footing with the types of historical evidence that
courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical
documents.' ' 156 To do otherwise, would "'impose an impossible burden
of proof' on aboriginal peoples, and 'render nugatory' any rights that
they have."'57 While groundbreaking, this standard lacks detail, and, as
of this writing, only one lower Canadian court has interpreted this
standard.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of British Columbia interpreted the
Delgamuukw court's reasoning in Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia.
The aboriginal claimants in Tsilhqot'in Nation sought to secure
aboriginal title as well as rights to hunt and trap. 58  Similar to the
evidence in Delgamuukw, the oral traditional evidence presented in this
case was reinforced through ritual, adding some degree of reliability.159
The court adopted Vansina's definitions and applied them to the rationale
of the Supreme Court of Canada quoted above to conclude that
determining the reliability of the oral tradition was a key factor in the
tradition's admissibility as hearsay evidence. 160  The court also stated
that oral traditional evidence does not need to be corroborated by
historical documents or archaeological evidence. 16' The Tsilhqot'in
Nation court proposed that "even where oral tradition is contradicted by
addition to the oral tradition, the adaawk and kungax are represented physically through
"totem poles, crests and blankets." Id. Both the adaawk and kungax are largely used for
the same purpose among the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, respectively, though the trial
judge noticed that the kungax is more "'in the nature of a song ... which is intended to
represent the special authorities and responsibilities of a chief .... ' Id. (omissions in
original) (quoting Delgamuukw, 3 W.W.R. at para. 342).
153. Id. (quoting Delgamuukw, 3 W.W.R. at 164).
154. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 87 (Can.).
155. Id. atpara. 86.
156. Id. at para. 87.
157. Id (quoting R. v. Simon, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, 408 (Can.)).
158. See Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, paras. 26-28
(Can.).
159. See id. at paras. 133-34.
160. Seeid. atparas. 139-46.
161. Id. at para. 152. The court opined that "if [oral traditional evidence] were never
given any independent weight but only used and relied upon where there was
confirmatory evidence[,]" it would result in such evidence being "'consistently and
systemically undervalued."' Id. at para. 153 (quoting Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 98.
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documentary evidence, oral tradition may still prevail and assessment
must be made to gauge which, on a balance of probabilities, is more
plausible. 16 2 The Tsilhqot'in Nation court further stated that it would
only seek corroborative evidence if the oral traditional evidence on its
own were insufficient to reach a conclusion of fact. 
163
Because of Van der Peet, Delgamuukw, and Tsilhqot'in Nation,
Canadian courts today have a flexible attitude toward aboriginal oral
traditional evidence, as well as an explicit evidentiary exception. The
following Part will compare the Canadian standard with the American
courts' statements on oral traditional evidence, examine problematic
areas in the court decisions of both countries, and propose a new Federal
Rule of Evidence that addresses Native American oral traditional history.
III. CONFUSION, INCONSISTENCY, AND A SOLUTION
A. Discussion ofAmerican and Canadian Court Decisions: That
Which Was Left Unsaid
1. American Courts
Although American courts have addressed the issue of oral tradition
and history as evidence, the decisions are difficult to parse. Native
American groups are disadvantaged because the treatment of oral
traditional evidence is murky and nearly impossible to discern. Future
tribal claimants and litigants may be unable to decide what evidence to
present or whether it will be admissible because of this lack of
consistency. While courts could address this issue directly, the American
claims court and circuit courts have failed to do so. As the following
subsection explains, the claims court is perhaps most problematic
because of the number of cases relating to this topic the court regularly
encounters.
a. The Silence and Inconsistencies of the Claims Court
The claims court, with its lack of detail and consistency between
cases, has been particularly haphazard in addressing oral traditional
evidence. Thus, there exists precedent supporting both the denial164 and
admission 165 of this evidence. Confederated Tribes followed Pueblo de
162. Id.
163. See Tsilhqot'in, 2007 BCSC at para. 196.
164. See Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143, 152-53 (1938);
Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 347, 368 (1933).
165. See Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United
States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 204 (1966); Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 505
(1964).
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Zia,166 but Zuni Tribe, the most recent case, did not refer to either.167
While there is a general trend toward acceptance of oral traditional
evidence, neither Zuni Tribe, nor Pueblo de Zia, nor Confederated Tribes
addressed the viewpoint of the older Court of Claims cases that looked
upon oral traditional evidence with a less favorable eye. 168  The
unpredictability of the claims courts' cases is detrimental to Native
American claimants seeking relief. Future claimants will not know if
they should refer to the 1930s U.S. Court of Claims cases, the 1960s U.S.
Court of Claims cases, or only to Zuni Tribe, the most recent case from
the U.S. Claims Court. 169  Each case, except for Pueblo de Zia and
Confederated Tribes, seems to stand on its own, and the court can freely
and unpredictably choose which rationale to adopt.
Moreover, in all of the above cases, the claims courts repeatedly
failed to describe the evidence or its rationale in a manner that tribal
claimants would be able to follow, leaving future claimants unsure as to
whether their evidence is at all analogous to the evidence successfully
admitted in previous cases. This neglect is evident in Zuni Tribe, in
which the U.S. Claims Court failed to address or mention the claimants'
use of over 1,000 pages of depositions of anecdotal evidence 170 _
evidence that the court ultimately accepted. Nevertheless, future
claimants will not be able to discern whether presentation in the form of
depositions determined the court's decision, whether the content of the
evidence indicated its reliability, or whether the court relied on some
other factor. Perhaps the Zuni Tribe court accepted the depositions as
evidence because Wiget used his three-pronged test-validity, reliability,
and consistency-and avoided outside corroborative evidence until after
he had finished interviewing informants.17 ' Or perhaps the U.S. Claims
Court accepted the oral traditional evidence because the content seemed
credible. As discussed above, the Sokaogon court found the content of
the oral traditional evidence to be suspiciously farfetched. 72 While Zuni
Tribe occurred several years earlier in a different jurisdiction, perhaps
166. See Confederated Tribes, 177 Ct. Cl. at 204.
167. See generally Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987).
168. See generally id.; Confederated Tribes, 177 Ct. Cl. 184; Pueblo de Zia, 165 Ct.
Cl. 501.
169. Again, because the Court of Claims was abolished, it is unclear how the cases
should serve as precedent. The Claims Court, which replaced the Court of Claims,
retains all of the Court of Claims' jurisdiction and "continues, uninterrupted, a judicial
tradition more than 140 years old." About the Court, supra note 11. In addition, neither
Westlaw nor LexisNexis indicates caution for the oldest, negative cases. Regardless, the
Court of Claims cases' historical significance provides valuable context for this
Comment. The Court of Claims and the Court of Federal Claims are one and the same.
170. Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 173.
171. See generally id.
172. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 2 F.3d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1993).
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the U.S. Claims Court found that the content of the Zuni's oral traditional
evidence was reasonable enough to be plausible.
Furthermore, future claimants have little guidance as to how they
need to present their evidence, thus limiting a claimant's ability to
satisfactorily prepare for court. In Coos Bay, the U.S. Court of Claims
stated that the oral traditional evidence must outweigh any conflicting
documentary evidence, but it did not say how claimants should
accomplish this task. 73 The U.S. Court of Claims in Pueblo de Zia and
Confederated Tribes stated that corroboration with documents or other
outside sources is necessary in order for claimants to use oral traditional
evidence.174 Again, there is no mention of how much corroboration is
necessary, or what to do if documents detailing the events in question do
not exist. Even if contemporary documents are available, they will likely
portray only European Americans' experiences and perceptions, and will
likely not be useful to a Native American tribe. As the law stands now, it
seems that tribal claimants instead must test their luck, risking funds and
resources to present evidence in a manner that a court may ultimately
find to be inadequate proof of the tribe's claim.
b. The Circuit Courts' Lack of Explanation
The federal circuit court cases, Sokaogon Chippewa Community and
Bonnichsen, both rejected the use of oral traditional evidence.
75
Notably, however, neither circuit addressed questions such as whether
oral traditional evidence could ever be admissible, and, if so, whether
courts would accept such evidence only in Native American claims
cases. Furthermore, both circuits failed to address why exactly they
found the oral traditional evidence inadequate.
It is unclear why the Sokaogon court deemed the evidence
unacceptable. The court was hesitant regarding the content of the oral
traditional evidence, opining that there were "too many ransoms,
shipwrecks, lost and stolen maps, and deathbed revelations to be
plausible[.]"'' 6 The court did not explain whether it would have admitted
the oral traditional evidence had the content been more plausible.' 77 The
court also mentioned that counsel had not attempted to present the
173. See Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143, 152-53 (1938).
174. See Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or. V. United
States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194 (1966); Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 504
(1964).
175. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2004);
Sokaogon, 2 F.3d at 224.
176. Sokaogon, 2 F.3d at 222.
177. See generally id. at 219.
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evidence in a way that would allow the testimony to be admissible. 178
Again, the court failed to specify exactly how the evidence was presented
or how it should have been presented.
The Bonnichsen reasoning raises similar questions as to why the
court rejected the oral traditional evidence presented by Native American
groups. There, the court also failed to describe the evidence or detail
why it was not sufficient to support the NAGPRA claim. 179 The court
first examined the inadequacies of oral traditional transmission, noting
that over generations, oral tradition becomes increasingly inaccurate.
1 80
The court concluded that the evidence was too ancient to be
admissible.18' The court never explained how ancient evidence must be
for a court to consider it too ancient to be reliable. Thus, the court failed
to provide any guidance for future plaintiffs to follow. Potential
claimants do not know if the Ninth Circuit is completely adverse to oral
traditional evidence or if it will admit more recent evidence. If courts
addressed these issues, future tribal claimants would be better prepared
to submit their evidence in a manner that would likely be admissible,
perhaps reducing appeals and evidentiary inquiries.
2. Canadian Courts and an Evidentiary Exception for Oral
Tradition
As stated above, 82 the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly created
an evidentiary exception for aboriginal oral tradition. 83  While the
Delgamuukw standard was indeed revolutionary and positive for tribal
claimants seeking to submit their oral traditional evidence, one must also
keep in mind its shortcomings: the Court did not detail how to gauge the
reliability of oral tradition or whether oral histories, such as anecdotal
evidence, would also be accepted. The next section will detail the
strengths of the Canadian evidentiary exception for oral traditional
evidence, as well as the effects the exception may have for future
claimants.
a. Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot'in: Strengths
First, the Supreme Court of Canada formulated the evidentiary
exception to combat the injustice the Court perceived. 84  The Court
178. Id. at 224-25.
179. See generally Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d 864.
180. See id. at 881-82.
181. Id.
182. See supra Part II.F.
183. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 87 (Can.).
184. Id.
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stated that oral traditional evidence would be hearsay because it is not
direct testimony from an eyewitness. 85 However, assumedly because
the Court realized that aboriginal claimants would have few other
mechanisms with which to support their claims, the Court articulated an
evidentiary exception, allowing aboriginal groups to submit oral
traditional evidence without violating the rule against hearsay. 1
86
The Court also stated that corroborating evidence is not
necessary, 187 further increasing aboriginal groups' ability to use oral
traditional evidence. In many cases involving Native American oral
traditional evidence, it seems that the only way to validate the evidence
is to compare it with documents, archaeological records, or other
generally accepted forms of evidence.18 8 Unfortunately, contemporary
documents written by individuals of European descent could be biased or
otherwise suspect.' 89  The decision establishes that oral traditional
evidence is analogous to documentary evidence and has similar potential
for reliability.'9" With this nuance in the standard, aboriginal groups are
more easily able to support their claims. Despite this, however, the
standard is not highly detailed and raises many questions for lower courts
to consider.
b. Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot'in: Weaknesses
While foregoing corroboration acknowledged the bias in
contemporary European documents, the Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot'in
courts did not offer any other solution to prove the veracity of oral
tradition. The Tsilhqot'in court emphasized that reliability is a hallmark
of an oral tradition that can be used as evidence,' 9' but did very little to
define how to determine that reliability, or how potential claimants could
gauge that aspect of their own evidence.
The Tsilhqot'in Nation court, like this Comment, chose to adopt the
definitions used by Vansina 192 but failed to acknowledge Vansina's
185. See id. atpara. 86.
186. See id. atpara. 87.
187. See id.
188. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 185.
The validity of oral testimonies is often established by corroboration with other
forms of evidence, but in many aspects of Indian claims cases such other
evidence is often missing or itself subject to dispute. In such instances, the
only guarantor of the validity of oral testimonies is the reliability or internal
integrity of the tradition.
Id.
189. See id.
190. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 87.
191. See Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, para. 139 (Can.).
192. See id. at paras. 141-46.
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criticisms of oral tradition. Vansina has concerns that ancient oral
tradition will be unable to provide factual truth about events. 193  He
advocates for the use of oral tradition in determining general trends and
attitudes in a historical context. 194 In tribal claims, however, claimants
may not always wish to merely prove general trends in their history.
Claimants may hope to prove their occupation of a specific tract of
land, 195 their use of hunting or fishing techniques at a certain time in
history, 196 or recent damages to land that they currently OCCupy. 19 7 If
corroboration proves to be unhelpful or harmful, especially in the case of
racially biased documentary evidence, it is unclear how tribal claimants
can demonstrate the reliability of their evidence.
Furthermore, the courts in Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot'in rely on the
fact that the oral traditional evidence in question was oral tradition, not
oral history, and, moreover, was often repeated and verified at
gatherings.1 98  The Delgamuukw court was unclear about whether it
favored the oral traditional evidence for reasons other than the fact that it
was told repetitively under much scrutiny by members of the same
Nation. 99 Unfortunately, oral tradition of this type is uncommon in the
United States.200 Rather, most Native American oral traditional evidence
is anecdotal in nature20' and does not have the history and extensive
cultural repetition of formal oral tradition that the courts valued in both
Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot'in.
202
Because of the lack of history and formality of oral tradition in
Native American cultures, this anecdotal evidence may be more difficult
for American courts to accept. Courts may view anecdotal evidence as
too similar to ordinary hearsay, rather than as evidence as reliable as
historical documents. It remains to be seen whether Canadian courts will
193. See VANSINA, supra note 7, at 31.
194. See id. at 31-32.
195. See generally Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 1010 (using oral traditional evidence to
prove title to land).
196. See generally R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.) (using oral
traditional evidence to support the claim that aboriginal fishing rights included the right
to sell commercially); Tsilhqot'in, 2007 BCSC 1700 (using oral traditional evidence to
attain hunting and fishing rights).
197. See generally Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607 (1987);
Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15 (using oral traditional evidence to describe the
negative changes in land over time, though the Zuni Tribe court opinion discusses only
title to the land in question).
198. See Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 93; Tsilhqot'in, 2007 BCSC at paras. 133-34.
199. See generally Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 1010.
200. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 184.
201. See id.
202. See Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 93; Tsilhgot'in, 2007 BCSC at paras. 133-
[Vol. 118:3
NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE
also accept anecdotal oral history and oral tradition, along with well-
established, formal oral tradition.
B. Andrew Wiget's Research Methods from Zuni Tribe of New Mexico
v. United States
Wiget's research methods were groundbreaking in that they
presented oral, anecdotal evidence to an Anglo-American court in a
manner comprehensible to and compatible with the documentary culture
of Anglo-American courts. This section will discuss the benefits of
having this case and such detailed records for future claimants and expert
witnesses. However, there are also drawbacks to Wiget's methods, and
the methods that worked for one tribe's oral traditional evidence should
not be considered a cure-all. The final section will present a proposal for
a Federal Rule of Evidence providing an exception for oral traditional
evidence.
1. Andrew Wiget's Methods: Strengths
Wiget's research techniques in Zuni Tribe provide a method to
demonstrate how oral traditional evidence could be admissible without
corroboration from outside sources and how to establish the veracity of
anecdotal evidence.20 a Wiget did not corroborate the evidence with
outside documents or archaeology. 2°4 Instead, he was fairly isolated
during his research, which later proved to be "useful in revealing the
integrity of the [oral] tradition., 205  Wiget cross-referenced each
informant's histories and used the consistency and integrity of a
particular informant's history to produce evidence that agreed with that
of archaeological and documentary research.20 6 Furthermore, because
oral history and oral tradition may incorporate myth, exaggeration, or
bias, Wiget had to determine if an informant was coloring his or her story
in the way he or she wished to see it, or if an informant was stating what
he or she actually experienced.20 7 For example, Wiget found that if an
informant neatly told his or her history with meaning assigned to events,
the information was likely second-hand knowledge organized in a
manner that made sense to the informant.20 s If the informant told some
portions confidently but also gave disorganized or hesitant answers,
Wiget found that the answer was indicative of the limits of the
203. See generally Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15.
204. See id. at 174.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 174, 185.
207. See id. at 177.
208. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 182.
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informant's knowledge, and Wiget was able to depend on the
information about which the informant was certain.20 9 Finally, Wiget did
not depend on one or a few informants; rather, he interviewed numerous
people and amassed 1,300 pages of deposition testimony to present to the
210trial court. Wiget could accurately estimate the years in which certain
events occurred by analyzing the trends among numerous deponents. As
a result, the evidence appeared that much more reliable.211
Wiget's methods are also useful for Native American groups
because the methods can apply to the presentation of both oral tradition
and oral history.212  As stated above,213 oral traditional evidence
presented to American courts would likely be anecdotal, which courts
may view as less reliable.214 Organizing the anecdotal evidence into
depositions may be more palatable for courts215 because the evidence will
be organized and will not appear to be mere gossip. Moreover, this
method could be used to interpret formalized oral tradition,21 6 like that in
Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot'in. Experts can analyze the validity,
reliability, and consistency of formal oral tradition, as well as anecdotal
evidence. Many view formal oral tradition as more reliable than
anecdotal evidence,21 7 but, in practice, that may not necessarily be true.
Rather than requiring a court to interpret a performed monologue of oral
218tradition, courts may be more accepting of interviews and depositions,
which transform an exotic genre of evidence into a more familiar
medium. Using Wiget's methods will allow courts to better understand
oral traditional evidence and articulate holdings in an informed manner.
Thus, until the judges themselves are more educated about oral
traditional evidence, it may be effective to present the evidence to the
court in deposition form.
2. Andrew Wiget's Methods: Weaknesses
Wiget's methods are not ideal, however. A notable shortcoming is
the possible necessity of anthropologist expert witnesses. Native
American groups may need to hire an expert like Wiget for a court to
comprehend their evidence. Anthropologists with experience in
209. See id. at 176.
210. Id. at 173-74.
211. See id. at 185.
212. See id. at 184.
213. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
214. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
215. See Stohr, supra note 2, at 694.
216. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 184.
217. See id.
218. See Mary Ann Pylypchuk, The Value of Aboriginal Records as Legal Evidence
in Canada: An Examination of Sources, ARCHIVARIA, Summer 1991, at 51, 52.
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interpreting oral traditions and histories may be difficult to locate, and
the financial cost of an expert will pose another hurdle for Native
American groups to overcome in seeking relief.
Another limitation to Wiget's methods is that some cultures believe
that recording and translating the evidence corrupts the essence of the
oral tradition or history.219 In some cases, the oral traditional evidence
may have sacred aspects and cultural significance of which Anglo-
American courts are ignorant, and Native American groups may be
hesitant about recording such sacred tradition.220 In these situations,
Wiget's methods may not satisfy certain Native American peoples. Even
so, the use of anthropological expert witnesses could ensure that judges
better understand the sacredness or cultural relevance of the evidence,
and thus afford the evidence the appropriate respect. Unfortunately, the
lack of cross-cultural education between Anglo-American courts and
Native American claimants indicates that expert witnesses will likely
prove crucial to these cases. Wiget's methods, in these instances, would
be a compromise between the claimants and the courts: the claimants'
evidence may have to be "translated," but in return, the judge will be far
more likely to examine the evidence in a fair, unbiased manner because
the evidence would now exist in a form familiar to a judge schooled in
the Anglo-American legal culture.
If the United States adopted a rule of evidence like the one detailed
below, tribal claimants would still need a manner in which to present
their evidence, especially if it is anecdotal rather than traditional.
Wiget's methods remedy the courts' unfamiliarity with oral tradition and
history with expert testimony and depositions, thereby freeing up courts
to consider the oral traditional evidence as they would anything else.
C. Proposal: An Evidentiary Rule Allowing for Oral Traditional
Evidence as Testimony
The following is a proposed rule of evidence that will allow courts
to better accommodate the use of oral traditional evidence. Judicial
precedent has proven unwieldy in the face of this particular issue, and, in
the United States, a Federal Rule of Evidence is better equipped to
handle the various criteria that courts should consider. This proposed
rule incorporates Wiget's innovations, definitions from NAGPRA, and
aspects of oral traditional evidence emphasized by both American and
219. See id. at 54.
220. See id. at 52-53 ("Aboriginal evidence is ... more than simply court evidence
relating to aboriginal peoples. It is testimonies and exhibits which, having emanated
from aboriginal societies, substantiate the enduring validity of the laws, philosophies,
norms and customs of those societies.").
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Canadian courts, resulting in a series of factors. The proposed rule is as
follows:
Oral traditional evidence, defined as any oral technique conveying
information including, but not limited to, cultural information, past
events, or legend, shall be admitted as testimony if its veracity can be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Courts shall balance the
following criteria:
1. Validity, or the ability of the Native American group to
corroborate the evidence with other materials, such as
documents, recordings, photographs, etc.
221
2. Reliability, or "the consistency with which an individual
will tell the same story about the same events on different
occasions."
222
3. Consistency, or "the degree to which the form or content of
one testimony conforms with other testimonies."
'223
4. The age of the oral traditional evidence, if over 1,000 years
old.
5. The degree of formality used in conveying the oral
traditional evidence.
This rule gives courts more guidance in analyzing oral traditional
evidence while allowing Native American groups the freedom to
establish the above criteria through any number of methods. While
Wiget's depositional method is a viable technique for demonstrating the
reliability of oral traditional evidence, it is an intense and expensive
process. Courts should not require every group seeking to use oral
traditional evidence to take thousands of depositions if, for example, the
evidence is reliable in other ways, like the adaawk and kungax detailed
in Delgamuukw.224
In addition, the above rule accounts for the decisions from the
claims courts, circuit courts, and Canadian courts and ensures that
American courts do not focus solely on one aspect of oral traditional
evidence. For example, as noted in Bonnichsen, the age of the evidence
may be a significant factor in examining the evidence. 225 The proposed
rule suggests that courts scrutinize the age of the evidence if it dates well
221. See Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15, at 177.
222. Id. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alice Hoffman, Reliability
and Validity in Oral History, in ORAL HISTORY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 67,
70 (David K. Dunaway & Willa K. Baum eds., 1984)).
223. Id. at 179.
224. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 13 (Can.).
225. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2004).
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before European contact. Even so, if the other factors of the proposed
rule weigh in favor of admission, the age of the evidence may be of no
concern. Corroboration is also considered even though other evidence,
especially documentary evidence, could be biased. However, if the oral
traditional evidence can be corroborated by some other genre of
evidence, that could be an indicator of the oral evidence's veracity. If
not, other factors could balance that weakness. Only the criterion used in
Sokaogon-that of believable content-has been excluded. The content
of oral traditional evidence may be too susceptible to cultural bias to be
included in the list of factors. If the oral traditional evidence is truly
farfetched, the other factors-particularly corroboration, reliability, and
consistency-will demonstrate that the evidence may not be suitable for
use in court.
IV. CONCLUSION
While predicting the outcome of a case is nearly impossible, one
ought to be able to anticipate whether a court will admit the evidence
supporting one's claim. The manner in which the American claims court
and circuit courts have decided the cases involving oral traditional
evidence has created uncertain terrain, and claimants and plaintiffs are
unable to predict whether courts will accept the content, presentation, or
age of such evidence. Moreover, both American and Canadian courts
have consistently avoided articulating what is required to establish
reliable oral traditional evidence.
Any kind of rule providing guidance would be far better than no
rule at all. Wiget's methods of establishing the reliability of oral
traditional evidence, 226 along with decisions like Delgamuukw,27 have
shown that oral traditional evidence can indeed be a source of truth that
has the full potential to illuminate facts, like any other source of
evidence. Because of this reality, the Federal Rules of Evidence should
allow Native American groups to present such evidence in American
courts. The rule proposed in this Comment attempts to remedy this legal
deficiency. The law, as it currently stands, is unpredictable with regard
to this genre of evidence. A clearly stated rule will grant future
claimants increased accessibility to the courts and ensure that evidentiary
confusion and ignorance will not bar remedies to past injustices.
226. See generally Folklore and Oral History, supra note 15.
227. See Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at para. 87.
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